UiPath: On the Path to a Blockbuster IPO?

by Sandeep Kumar | April 21, 2021

UiPath is a pioneer of the Robotic Process Automation industry. The company filed its first S-1/A this week, setting an initial price range for its shares. Shares are going to be listed in the price range of $52 — $54 bringing the valuation to $26.90 Bn — $27.90 Bn. It is all set to launch the IPO under the ticker ‘PATH’ on the New York Stock Exchange.

Incorporated in 2015 and headquartered in New York, UiPath develops computerized workflows to build, manage, measure, and engage with processes. Customers benefit from the platform’s innovative capabilities by eliminating work spent on time-consuming, repetitive, and tedious tasks.

The company’s products have become increasingly attractive for companies looking to boost productivity. This is especially true amid the global pandemic that has enforced technology and automation adoptions. The demand is much higher than initially expected. This has been driving the demand for IPO and the investors are bullish on the ‘PATH’ stock.

Company Snapshot 

  • Annualised Renewal Rate (ARR): $580 Mn
  • Annualised Renewal Rate growth Yoy: 65%
  • Total Customers: 7,968
  • Customers ≥ $100k
  • ARR: 1002
  • Dollar based net retention rate: 145%
  • Net Loss: $92 Mn

So how does UiPath make money?

Product Offering: The end-to-end platform provides a whole range of robotic process automation via a suite of interrelated software offerings. The flagship product offering, the UiPath Studio is an easy to use, drag-and-drop development platform designed for RPA developers engineering complex process automation. Other offerings include the UiPath Robot which emulates human behavior to execute the processes built-in Studio and the UiPath Orchestrator that tracks and logs Robot activity.

Market Model: UiPath has an efficient go-to-market model, which consists primarily of an enterprise field sales force supplemented by a high velocity inside sales team focused on small and mid-sized customers, as well as a global strategic sales team focused on the largest global customers.

Revenue Model: UiPath generates revenue from the sale of licenses for its proprietary software, its maintenance and support, and professional services. The license fees are based primarily on the number of users who access the software and the number of automation running on their platform. The license agreements have annual terms, and/or multi-year terms. Additionally, UiPath provides maintenance and support for its software as well as non-recurring professional services such as training and implementation services.

 

 

License (57% of revenue): UiPath’s primary business model is selling licenses through annual and multi-year subscription contracts. Being 57% of its business it shows a vibrant business model and the right product mix which is well received by the market.

Maintenance and Support (38% of revenue): The relatively large amount of maintenance and support revenue suggests that the customer base is being retained.

Services (<5% of revenue): A small part of its business is customer education and technical services likely around their UiPath academy.

UiPath’s Road to Dominance

UiPath is at the forefront of technology innovation and thought leadership in automation.

Companies such as UiPath have two ways to grow: either blasting through the market and acquiring more and more customers or be more docile and focus more on retention than expansion. UiPath chose the former. The company expanded internationally very early on, acquiring more and more customers from different nations. The growth was absolutely out of control.

Surprisingly, this does not mean that UiPath compromised on customer retention, the killer of all SaaS companies. UiPath managed to find the middle ground between blatant expansion and customer retention. The S-1 reveals an extremely high 96% “gross retention rate” and a dollar-based net retention rate of 145%. So, this says UiPath’s existing customers are spending more with the company and also sticking with it.

The Robotic Process Automation Landscape

According to an estimate by Bain & Company the size of the market for automation software will grow to approximately $65 Bn.

The market for automation is super-hot right now with the COVID pandemic making automation a dire necessity. UiPath is the clear market leader in this category. The S-1 puts their Total Addressable Market (TAM) at $60 Bn. Pre pandemic this figure stood at $30 Bn. Double the market size, in just under a year. That’s some serious growth.

It is clear that UiPath wishes to tap into the red-hot IPO market and rightly so. It needs to pad its balance sheet with as much cash as it can muster for the massive opportunity and the competitor risk it faces ranging from its peers such as Automation Anywhere to the giants like Microsoft. The principal purposes of this offering are to increase its capitalization and financial flexibility.

This is data from the Brookings Institution and the Organization for Economic Co-Development that depicts productivity statistics for the U.S. The smaller charts on the right are for Germany and Japan.

                                  Source: Brookings Institution and the Organization for Economic Co-Development 

The US showed productivity growth in ’95-’04, but that slacked off later. Similar is the case with Germany and Japan where the productivity levels have been falling continuously.

Humans are slowly reaching the very limit of what they can do alone to solve the most pressing challenges around the globe. Automation is what can free up labor and divert human intelligence and creativity into more engaging and worthwhile problems. The market is ready for automation and the post-pandemic world will witness never seen before levels of automation. 

Key Industry Risks

  • Barriers to Entry: Robotic process automation is very difficult to implement and therefore many organizations will not able to implement it thereby affecting the industry growth.
  • Sustainability: Any automation, no matter how advanced is not capable of perfectly emulating human behavior.
  • Affordability: The entire automation process is a costly proposition and affordability is an issue.

Key Company Risks

  • Growth Opportunity: The revenue growth rate of above 80% YoY may not be sustainable in the future due to the maturation of the business, increased competition, and changes to technology.
  • Limitations to Scalability: While the UiPath platform is intuitive and beginner-friendly, intra-organizational scalability poses an issue. Also, many features offered by UiPath are offered for free by other productivity platforms.
  • Pitfalls of Constant Innovation: Automation and Productivity Software is a fast-changing landscape. UiPath will need to disrupt itself to stay relevant.

Financial Highlights

Revenue: Total Revenue of $336 Mn in 2020 grew to $607 Mn in 2021, a YoY growth of more than 80%. Most of the increase was fuelled by the maintenance fees and other incomes. A 71% increase in license fees indicates a very fast-growing customer base.

UiPath has gone from making $169 Mn in the last quarter of FY 2019 to $580 Mn in the last quarter of FY 2021.

Gross-profit Margin: The gross profit margin stands at 90% and has increased from 72% in 2019 to 90% in 2021. This comes on the back of reduced travel costs due to the COVID pandemic and rapid international expansion which generated 66% and 61% of the revenue in 2019 and 2020 respectively.

Net-profit Margin: The Net Loss has also been improving over time, in spite of the break neck speed that UiPath seems to be growing at. This is explained by the Operating Expenses Line Item where all the three viz. licensing costs, maintenance costs, and other costs should have gone up, keeping in line with the revenue growth. On the contrary, all the three went down, while as the revenues shot up.

Cash Flow: Unlike a lot of other growth startups going public, UiPath has a positive free cash flow, saving cash on the operational front. This is rare for a rapidly growing company. Other growth stage companies to go public such as Snowflake and CrowdStrike had negative free cash flows. Quite a few haven’t made money, even months after listing.

This may pose a concern for investors who view UiPath to be a rapidly growing, disruptive startup. Generating cash may be interpreted as a sign of UiPath transitioning into its mature stage.

Alternatively, the plan may be, to slow down the growth, settle down, consolidate the customer base and the product offering, and then continue explosive growth. Daniel Dines, the founder of UiPath has been an unconventional CEO on many fronts, this may as well be a part of the bigger picture.

Other Interesting Tid-bits

Annualized Renewal Rate (ARR) is the key metric UiPath uses to gauge its business. It illustrates the ability to acquire new subscription customers and to maintaining the existing subscription customers. The ARR may fluctuate as a result of a number of factors, including customers’ satisfaction, pricing, competitive offerings, economic conditions, or overall changes in customers’ spending levels.

 

UiPath’s “ARR” rose by 65% over the last year, indicating a massive jump in the number of new consumers using UiPath. This again highlights UiPath’s ‘expanding, yet retaining’ value proposition.

  • Number of Customers: 6,300
  • Number of Enterprise Customers: 1,500. As of January 31, 2021, UiPath had 7,968 customers, including 80% of the Fortune 10 and 63% of the Fortune Global 500.
  • Number of Developers on the UiPath platform: 200,000
  • Number of People enrolled in UiPath Courses: 100,000

Is UiPath prepared to handle the competition?

The platform addresses the market for Intelligent Process Automation, which International Data Corporation, estimated would have a value of $17 billion by the end of 2020 and is expected to grow at a four-year compound annual growth rate of approximately 16% to $30 billion by the end of 2024. According to an estimate by Bain & Company the size of the market for automation software will grow to approximately $65 billion.

 

UiPath is a market leader in the Automation industry commanding a whopping 44% of the entire market.

Nearly every company’s a winner that gets to feature in the RPA Magic Quadrant from Gartner, and even just getting on the chart is a win for some companies. UiPath ranks very high, at the very top right of the matrix, strongly positioned as an industry leader as well as a visionary, with only Automation Anywhere coming close.

 

Source: Gartner’s RPA Magic Quadrant

The UiPath IPO will be a decisive moment for not just UiPath itself, but also Automation Anywhere. A tie-breaker between the two, the UiPath IPO will either force Automation Anywhere to respond with an IPO or simply perish.

Are the Valuations on the Right Path?

The NASDAQ 100 Technology Index is up by 62%, this year alone. This coupled with the high demand for the RPA products worldwide, and you get a red-hot market for the UiPath IPO. This is likely to benefit UiPath massively but is the valuation justified or the financials go for a toss?
UiPath was valued at $35 Bn following its last financing round in February. Based on a recently released statement by the management UiPath is likely to launch IPO with shares in the price range of $52-$54 bringing the valuation in the range of $26.90 — $27.90 Bn. This brings the EV/Revenue multiple to 45.88x.

 

 

How well do the Peers Fare?

Being the market leader with a 44% market share and its colossal size relative to the peers it is difficult comparing the company to its peers. However, we have compared it to its direct competitors Automation Anywhere (Private Company) and Blue Prism (London Stock Exchange: PRSM).

Taking the Taking EV/Revenue multiple into account and weighted average calculation of the comparable companies, we arrive at an NTM multiple of 12.33x which gives us an intrinsic valuation of $8.96 Billion.

Investment Recommendation

The UiPath IPO in any case is highly anticipated, being a market leader in the red-hot Robotic Process Automation market. The company has a strong reputation and a substantial client base. Despite that, it was a bit of shock that the IPO price range failed to reach the valuation company garnered in private funding. This might be caused by the general cooling of IPOs over the past few months.

Going public in a dynamic market like RPA is tricky. However, UiPath has demonstrated strong performance and growth potential and this should be an extremely successful IPO only cementing its leadership position. We forecast a strong performance and growth for the share and recommend a long-term positive outlook. 

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This article has been co-authored by Khubaib Abdullah and Ayush Dugar, who are in the Research and Insights team of Torre Capital.

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“All that glitters is not gold” — Growing valuation bubble of Indian start-ups

by Sandeep Kumar

 The valuation game

The Venture Capital valuation is a simple game, but never an easy one. While there is little to learn, to play it perfectly takes years, if not decades of experience under the belt.

So how do the VCs arrive at that valuation figure? Market Opportunity? Product Market Fit? Strong Founder Team? Disruptive Product Offering? Extensive Network Economics?

Nah.

Capital invested divided by the stake diluted. That’s it!

The VC chooses the amount of capital he is ready to deploy and the stake he wants to have in the company. Of course, the wish is to part with the least capital for the most stake. Now coming up with these two numbers, the capital chunk to invest and the amount of stake to buy, this is where experience comes in.

The winning bet in your portfolio

Most VCs have personal favorite ranges which they are comfortable with. Some VCs may like to hold only a few concentrated bets while others may want to deploy small amounts into numerous startups. The premise is the same. Each VC wishes to hold at least one winner in its portfolio, the winning bet that ‘returns the fund’.

This gets us to staging. The valuations do nothing to the VC portfolio, except increase the unrealized returns section, which, as the name suggests, are ‘unrealized’ and don’t mean anything unless the company makes an exit from that valuation.

But what if the company is not yet ready for an IPO or a buyout?

The VCs of course know this. Hence when they get together to finance a startup at some stage, let’s say series A, they are offering just enough money to take the startup to the next funding stage. This continues until the IPO or buyout.

Nowhere do the VCs use the DCF or any other model to find a fair value of the shares of the startup. Startup valuation is not a valuation game, it’s a pricing game. It is not about finding a startup trading at a lower than its fair value price and hoping the market corrects itself, the game is about finding another buyer who will be ready to pay higher. All this has nothing to do with cash flows generated from the assets held by the startup, adjusted for the underlying risks of all sorts (DCF basically). All these valuations are nothing more than exhaust fumes as suggested by Fred Wilson, an NYC based VC:

“Early-stage valuations aren’t valuations. They are the exhaust fumes of negotiation about two things — the amount raised and the amount of dilution.”

The information asymmetry

Now let’s take a look at what we have: You are a VC that is trying to get a stake in some startup. What do you do to get an idea of how much you should pay? You don’t have DCF or any other model to help. So, you look at what similar companies have been valued at. With new business models operating in diverse geographies, you realize that it is hard to say how you can define a similar company. Let’s say you came up with food delivery as one category. Despite the difference in the business models, one can hardly cobble together a list of 4–5 startups in the Indian space.

So, the VC game is plagued with opaque, inconsistent deal information. While the figures the VC arrives at are most probably wrong and have nothing to do with reality, they have nothing to worry about as long as they are able to find someone who’s ready to buy at a higher price from them.

The Indian startups in numbers

The past few years have been a gala time for the Indian startups who have managed to secure funding unabated despite the pandemic and its blues.

Startups in India managed to raise $7.8 Bn until April itself. This is a significant number almost 70% of the total $12.1 Bn raised in 2020 and more than 50% of $14.2 billion raised in 2019.

The average funding size has increased to $25.21 Mn, up from $14.94 Mn in 2020. There have been 402 funding rounds until April itself, against 1,114 deals in 2020 and 1,036 in 2019.

Overvaluation and the global landscape

The push towards absurd overvaluations has been a result of the negative interest rate environment. Post the GFC, there was heavy lending and even more borrowing. So much so that people had to pay up money just so that they could lend money. Of course, this led people to look for alternative avenues to park their money and generate juicy returns. The baseless optimism and hollow belief in spotting the next Bezos, Zuck, or Musk have led to an audacious amount of money flowing in, creating completely senseless valuations, having no roots in reality.

Tesla, more than $13 Bn in debt at the end of last year, recently had a market capitalization of $160 Bn, greater than General Motors and Ford combined. At the IPO price, Square was valued at close to $3 Bn, which is 50% below the $6 Bn valuations for which it had raised money from private investors a year before. Uber which in accounting terms stands at around 5x times its revenues, is also grossly overvalued as it is nowhere close to being the leader in the driverless car’s space. WeWork tried to go for a $47 Bn listing but ended up getting corrected to $8 Bn.

The WeWork fiasco was dubbed as a wake-up call in a Morgan Stanley report stating that the days of ‘’ were over.

Unicorns were considered rare. Today, however, the United States has a herd of more than 100 of them, with 100 more outside the US. Each worth a billion dollars or more.

Will history repeat itself?

Let’s talk about the Indian scenario and the startups which we believe are overvalued and most likely to come back to their intrinsic value as and when the markets correct themselves.

1. Byju’s: World’s most valuable Ed-Tech Company

Byju’s operates an online learning platform. It also creates a mobile app for pupils that offers a variety of learning activities. Exam preparation classes are also available. Original material, watch-and-learn movies, rich animations, and interactive simulations are all available to users on the site. The firm is having an EV/Revenue multiple of 17x.

It is the only major player in the Ed-Tech space in India, which has led the company to raise multiple rounds of funding and leading to an enormous increase in valuation. Knowledge in today’s world is free, however, Byju’s creates unique content with animation and the product often seems to be overpriced. In recent times there were a number of instances on various social media platforms where people questioned the pressure on the sales team and how Byju’s is so concerned about their sales when they try to push their offering in the market.

In the long run, the expected return from Byju’s is questionable. Below is the chart of the revenue and valuation of Byju’s over the last five years.

2. Cred — The borrower’s messiah

Losses in billions of dollars are nothing new for hyper-funded companies, especially when they’re chasing size and consumers at any cost. CRED’s metrics tell a tale in and of itself. CRED has made a profit of $71,000 in its second year of operation. CRED hasn’t been able to monetize its user base in FY20, despite acquiring a large customer base with a high propensity to spend and consume.

While the two-year-old company’s sales remained low, its total expenditure increased by more than 5.9 times to $52 Mn in FY20, compared to $9 Mn in FY19. The greatest cost center for the financial firm was advertisement and marketing, which accounted for 47.6% of total expenditure. From $3 Mn in FY19, such costs increased by 9.3 times to$25 Mn. During the fiscal year that ended in March 2020, CRED spent Rs 726.7 to earn a single rupee of operating revenue. CRED’s yearly loss in FY20 was INR 360.3 Crore, up 5.9 times from the $8 Mn it lost in FY19. The current cash burn is difficult to sustain, with an appalling EBITDA margin of -1979.5% in FY20, and the company will have to focus on its collections.

Despite registering astronomical losses it has attained a unicorn status by raising its valuation to $2.2 Bn in 2021. It is worth noting that the company is founded and led by Kunal Shah who is a known name in the start-up world for founding and leading numerous companies which may be an explanation behind the astronomical valuation of Cred. The graph below shows the valuation and losses of Cred over the years.

3. CarDekho — India’s leading car search venture

CarDekho helps users buy cars along with expert reviews, detailed specs, and prices, comparisons as well as videos and pictures of all car brands and models available in India. It has recently acquired an auto marketplace, Carmudi (Philippines) in late 2019 to expand business in Southeast Asia. GirnarSoft, the parent company of Jaipur-based automobile-related services behemoth CarDekho, has seen its losses increase by 155% to $45 Mn in FY2020. This comes after the company’s losses had already increased by 39% in the previous year.

Despite that CarDekho has managed to raise its valuation. Last year, Cars24, a CarDekho competitor, increased its consolidated revenue to $418 Mn and achieved unicorn valuation, and has a much lower EV/Revenue multiple. Let us now see the EV/Revenue Multiple of the peers in this game through the table below.

As per the last reported revenue and valuation figures.

We can infer from the table that CarDekho has a huge EV/Revenue multiple which signifies that the valuation of the firm is increasing at a much faster rate with respect to the revenue that the company generates, leading to overvaluation of the company. The graph below shows the valuation and revenue of CarDekho.

4. Unacademy

Unacademy is a Bangalore-based educational technology startup in India. Unacademy lessons are available in the form of Live Classes, which are both free and available on a subscription basis. Unacademy earned $12 Mn in revenue but spent $53 Mn, resulting in a loss of INR 300 crore. Employee benefits accounted for 23.7% of the edtech start-up’s costs, while other expenses accounted for 75%.

While 2020 brought plenty of development, the corporation would need to significantly increase its expenditures to reverse the losses it had in the fiscal year 2020, which ends on March 31, 2020. Unacademy’s revenue in FY21 is estimated to be over $55 Mn. It’s worth $3 Bn or approximately 35 times the expected income. The graph shows the valuation and loss of BharatPe.

5. BharatPe

When we talk about e-commerce giants, PayTm, Amazon, and Flipkart all wanted payments to take place within their own closed networks. BharatPe’s goal was to achieve what all the large brands were afraid to do: simplify things for retailers by adopting a standardized interoperable QR code. It allowed shops, street food vendors, and tea vendors to accept payments using any UPI app (PhonePe, Google Pay, PayTM, and so on) without having to download the apps. It was a simple and cost-effective approach with an added layer of security. The payment system’s complexity was reduced by a factor of ten by combining multiple UPI apps into a single sticker.

BharatPe was able to achieve early success by keeping things simple. BharatPe’s product strategy is based on making things simple for merchants, and the company uses P2M transactions as a springboard for future services. Because BharatPe does not charge merchants a setup or transaction fee, its fundamental feature money collection using QR codes is essentially a loss-maker for the company. It must spend a large amount of money to manage the servers that process millions of transactions every day. However, this provides BharatPe access to merchants who are passionate about their products and eagerly accept their offers. Despite having no visible revenue stream and without even earning a penny, the valuation of the company is increasing, and currently, it stands at $900 Mn, very close to the unicorn status. The graph shows the valuation and revenue of BharatPe.

The apprehensive loop of growing valuations

The indications are all too familiar. With large markets, illustrious founders, rapid growth, and top early-stage VCs on your side, you have a good chance of raising the next big round, even if you don’t yet have unicorn status (the desired billion-dollar value). And when major acquisitions are made for unproven companies, and valuations double or triple in a matter of months, it begs the question: are we in a bubble? This is always a challenge because most people only realize they were in an economic bubble after it has burst in the past.

Rich valuation multiples have also spread from the typical suspects — consumer internet companies — to enterprise software providers. This is a first. SoftBank, for example, invested in Mindtickle last year, valuing it at $500 Mn based on estimated revenue of $20 Mn — $25 Mn. Even SaaS companies in the United States, including Slack, Zoom, Snowflake, and Cloudflare, have gone public in recent years with great success. Sentiment in India often comes straight from the United States, particularly in related industries and from funds that invest in both nations, including several of India’s leading venture capital firms. Startup valuations are also affected by how publicly traded firms trade if retail investors are ready to pay high prices for loss-making companies, whether banks financing a share issue can find enough at a given price, and so on. There isn’t a single bubble across the board. Because of the vast quantity of money available in the market, investors are willing to pay a premium for good business. But that should be done judiciously.

Investors beware

For the first time in years, it’s possible to claim that private markets are more logical than public markets. If stock markets are the yardstick, select pricey companies may not be overvalued. A closer examination of what constitutes a bubble, as well as what Indian entrepreneurs are doing, reveals a more complete picture. Growth investing has been positive in industries that have recovered quickly from the epidemic, and there has been a lot of interest in a few market leaders. At such levels, one would expect some amount of rationalization. Investors must evaluate the prospects and the future road map of a company before investing. As more investments flow into a company without a proper business model or less revenue, it results in overvaluation creating a bubble. Investors can lose a colossal sum by not choosing the right company.

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This article has been co-authored by Sayan Mitra and  , who is in the Research and Insights team of Torre Capital.

Startup investing 101: The HNI’s guide to investments beyond the conventional asset class

by Sandeep Kumar

Why invest in startups?

Investing in a startup is a high-risk, high reward game

Deciding the right opportunity and best practices for investing in a startup

Ways to invest in startups

Delaying the IPO comes with certain advantages for Startups

How startup investing really works

When can you expect a return or are you locked in forever?

Source: Pitchbook and CBInsights

Exits are what investors care about, but many founders dream of becoming a unicorn and avoid using the word “exit” until it’s too late. Despite this, M&As accounted for 97% of departures in 2020. And the majority of them occurred prior to Series B.

Exit or no exit: A fatal call

DiDi Chuxing IPO: The race to dominate the global ride-hailing pool besides stiff competition

by Sandeep Kumar

DiDi Chuxing is a Chinese ride-hailing company headquartered in Beijing that was founded in 2012 by Cheng Wei. DiDi is China’s largest ride-hailing provider, with nearly 600 Mn riders and tens of millions of drivers. Didi Chuxing has the advantage of being a domestic player who is familiar with China and its clients. In China, the company’s app allows users to request trips from automobiles and taxis, as well as chauffeur services, minibusses, and ride-sharing services. If the IPO is successful, the company’s valuation could range between $70 Bn and $100 Bn. DiDi Chuxing, which is backed by SoftBank, plans to raise $1.5 Bn in debt financing through a revolving loan facility prior to its IPO. At a time when the Chinese government is cracking down on technology companies, Uber’s Chinese counterpart DiDi Chuxing may have filed for an IPO under the radar. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley have been chosen to lead the company’s initial public offering (IPO).

Snapshot

  • Headquarters: Beijing, China
  • Founded: 2012
  • Notable Investors: SoftBank, Alibaba Capital Partners, and Ant Group.
  • Capital Raised: $24.9 Bn
  • Latest Valuation: $62 Bn
  • Exchange: NYSE
  • Ticker Symbol: DIDI
  • Founder: Cheng Wei

Cementing the position with its industry-leading services

DiDi-Chuxing allocates calls from customers within 3 kilometers, though this boundary is being widened now. However, DiDi-Chuxing recently added a destination basic allocation system in which DiDi drivers can announce a destination and escaping location. The DiDi-Chuxing allocating systems have two modes: selection mode, which began in July 2018, allows the DiDi driver to choose the destination, including long-distance; and allocation mode, which allocates calls to DiDi drivers nearby.

DiDi-Chuxing usually assigns DiDi-X to veterans and DiDi-pool to new drivers. Customers of DiDi use payment methods such as Wechat-Pay, AliPay, DiDi-Pay, and others. When paying for any DiDi-Chuxing usage, DiDi customers can change their payment methods. When a customer sends a DiDi-Chuxing car-sharing fee, the fee is transferred from the customer to DiDi. If the customer did not pay, he must pay the fee before using DiDi-Chuxing again. In the case of long-distance driving in Beijing, the DiDi system raises the fee by up to 30% to compensate the DiDi driver for financial loss.

In the case of DiDi-Premier, there are discrepancies between the announced payment amount in advance and the actual payment amount after driving. These two amounts, however, differed by only a few cents. Even though the customer’s money is directly allocated to the driver’s bank account, the money may be paid a little late after driving. Actual payment takes place two days after the customer’s payment, or one-time weekly payment is made.

Currently, DiDi-Premier is charged a distance fee, a low-speed fee, and a long-distance fee. DiDi-Luxury also receives a long-distance basic fee and a fast call allocation fee. Because of weak government regulations and medium-level public transportation conditions, DiDi-Chuxing has a 3 km base call allocation system, with a trend toward increasing the allocation distance from more than 3 km up to 10 km in the case of DiDi-Luxury.

Ride-Hailing App’s concentrated Revenue Model

The majority of the company’s revenue comes from its private ride-hailing app. DiDi-X drivers received 80% of the revenue paid to DiDi-Chuxing by the customer. DiDi drivers can drive the DiDi car for 12 hours per day, which is calculated based on the DiDi operating time.

DiDi-Premier drivers earn 74% of the revenue. DiDi-Premier fees are 20% higher than DiDi-X fees, and DiDi-Premier drivers earn 20% more than DiDi-X drivers. DiDi-Luxury is five times more expensive than DiDi-X and three times more expensive than DiDi-Premier. DiDi-Chuxing pays DiDi-owned luxury car drivers 10,000 yuan per month in one-time and weekly payments. The fee for DiDi-Pool is 10% less than the fee for DiDi-X. If customers pay with Alipay, Alipay provides a small incentive to the drivers as part of an Alipay promotion in DiDi-Chuxing. If a DiDi driver cancels the allocation more than four times, the driver must pay DiDi-Chuxing a fee.

What is important is that the revenue of DiDi drivers is more than twice the minimum salary of university-graduated manpower under the weakness of China’s taxi industry and the automotive industry with the support of the Chinese government with limited regulatory power. The Chinese government regards DiDi-Chuxing as a kind of revenue-increasing engine for the people.

DiDi’s Business Timeline

 

A dominant strategic player in the Chinese Market with uncertain longevity

DiDi Chuxing has risen to the top of the online car-hailing market after merging with and acquiring Uber China. After driving Uber out of China in 2016, DiDi Chuxing quickly dominated the country’s massive ride-sharing market – but its position is far from secure, as more powerful rivals emerge to challenge its dominance. According to PwC, China’s shared travel market will reach $564 Bn by 2030, with a 32% annual growth rate. Many businesses have been drawn in by the massive shared travel dividend. China’s online car-hailing market exhibits a high level of market competition. Many players are still active, in addition to the dominant DiDi Chuxing. There is still room for a taxi-hailing market worth $100 Bn. The national average ride-hailing success rate is around 75%, and 25% of online ride-hailing demand remains unmet. This provides a lot of incentive for new entrants like Gaode Taxi, Meituan Taxi, Ruqi Travel, and other public online ride-hailing platforms.

DiDi Chuxing has approximately 554.7 Million orders, while the order volume of more than ten travel platforms such as T3 Travel, Cao Cao Travel, Wanshun Car-hailing, Xiangdao Travel, and Meituan Travel is less than 90 Mn, according to the calculation of the internal parameters of online car-hailing. As can be seen, DiDi Chuxing’s order volume far outnumbers that of other ride-hailing platforms. DiDi Chuxing, on the other hand, cannot sit back and relax. The company’s continued loss of market share has also planted a slew of hidden dangers for it. DiDi Chuxing’s market share accounted for 95% of the scale of online ride-hailing around 2016. Later, due to security incidents, DiDi Chuxing’s ride-hailing business was forced to go offline in the second half of 2018, and its market share also fell to 90%; according to calculations, DiDi Chuxing’s market share is only about 85% today.

How does DiDi fair over different regions and their market leaders?

 Source: PitchBook 

 Chinese Ride-Sharing Giant on the way to profitability 

DiDi Chuxing is dubbed “China’s Uber,” yet it really outperforms Uber and other competitors in the Chinese market. DiDi Chuxing, or DiDi, is a Chinese ride-hailing startup that has amassed over 550 Mn users and 31 Mn drivers since its launch nine years ago. DiDi claims to have a 99% market share in China’s taxi-hailing business and an 87% market share in private auto hailing, according to its own data. In comparison to Uber China’s 45 cities, it has a presence in over 400 cities across the country.

The company’s primary ride-hailing business is lucrative, and it has rebounded since the coronavirus outbreak in China, its home market. The corporation has 14 international markets, including Australia, Japan, Latin America, and Mexico, in addition to China. The business is more than just automobiles and cabs. DiDi also includes bus services and a chauffeur booking option, which might be beneficial if you’ve had too much to drink and need a designated driver to take both the car and the driver home.

DiDi’s financial performance is difficult to quantify because it is a privately held firm. In 2018, Chinese news outlets claimed losses of $1.6 Bn. While its primary ride-hailing company charged an average of 19% in commissions, overall expenses, which included tax payments and driver bonuses, were 21%, implying a 2% loss each journey. This pattern may be traced all the way back to the beginning.

Concerns Regarding the company

  • Massive expansion and competitive pressure: DiDi’s rapid expansion in China was fuelled by its fierce competition with Uber and lax government rules regarding ride-hailing services. DiDi created an army of drivers, which it bolstered with massive driver subsidies, allowing it to outrun Uber’s operations.
  • Regulation which limits driver’s work regions: China, unlike the United States, has rules that limit where residents can work. DiDi drivers from rural areas, in particular, are not allowed to work in larger cities unless they live there. Residency licenses come in a variety of levels, and cities vary in how aggressively they enforce them. However, many are tightening their belts. Many large cities are experiencing a driver shortage as a result of this, as many drivers do not want to risk paying fines for working where they do not live. It has also compelled DiDi to delete a large number of its drivers from its own app.
  • DiDi’s predicament is hardly exceptional: Regardless of size, all ride-sharing companies must choose between responsible expansion and safety. The murders that were reported exposed significant flaws in the DiDi app and its protocols. One major flaw was the company’s decision to outsource its passenger assistance system, which was chastised for failing to act on a previous complaint against one of the alleged murderers. Keeping an in-house customer support team would definitely strengthen the entire safety system, but it is a step that would have a negative influence on the company’s bottom line, which is already far from profitable.

Valuation analysis of the company

 Source: PitchBook 

Market sentiments surrounding the IPO

DiDi Chuxing is planning an initial public offering, with a capitalization of $60 Bn. Although no official date has been set, the company anticipates going public in the first half of 2021. When it comes to ride-hailing, you may only be familiar with Uber Technologies Inc. and Lyft Inc. DiDi, on the other hand, is one of the most well-known ride-hailing companies in the world. Even yet, the recent failures of ride-hailing IPOs are worth noting. Following their IPOs, both Uber and Lyft saw their stock prices plummet, trading as low as 70% below their IPO prices. DiDi, on the other hand, may have something the other businesses don’t.

DiDi has a 17.5% ownership in Uber, and DiDi has invested $1 Bn in Uber, so DiDi is essentially the Chinese Uber. But there’s a lot more to it. DiDi joined Kuaidi in 2015 to build a smartphone-based transportation services behemoth. Taxis, privately owned cars, carpooling, and buses would be summoned by users. This is in stark contrast to the Uber and Lyft models, which rely solely on scooters.

According to the sources, DiDi Chuxing chose New York because of a more predictable listing pace, the existence of comparable peers such as Uber Technologies Inc. and Lyft Inc., and a larger capital pool. The decision comes as the US Securities and Exchange Commission pushes forward with a plan to delist international companies from US stock exchanges if they fail to meet US auditing criteria.

But even if DiDi was restricted to China alone, there would still be a case for the company. It serves a nation of 2 Billion people and has plenty of institutional backing. Tech investment giant and Uber-backer SoftBank Group Corp backs DiDi. Alibaba Group Holding Ltd. and Tencent Holdings ADR also back the company. Before its IPO, DiDi still expects to have another funding round to boost the valuation. Some of its shares are still trading below its 2017 peak valuation of $56 Bn.

Extensive product expansion and the road ahead

DiDi Chuxing, a Chinese app-based ride-hailing business, has unveiled a new three-year strategy for steady and sustainable growth. DiDi’s three-year plan, dubbed “0188,” moves away from its “all-in-safety” approach and toward longer-term safety capacity building and user value creation. The number 0 represents safety as a top concern, while the other three numbers represent DiDi’s strategy aims.

As of the beginning of 2020, DiDi has completed over 1 Bn international journeys. DiDi prioritizes its platform for integrated four-wheeler (ride-hailing, taxi, designated driving, and hitch) and two-wheeler (bike and e-bike) and public transportation solutions, as well as it’s subsidiary Xiaoju Automobile Solutions, autonomous driving, fintech services, and smart transportation businesses.

A customer-centric car leasing business has been unveiled by DiDi and its long-time partner BAIC, as well as a consortium of automotive industry enterprises and Chinese state-owned institutions. “In the next three years, the companies hope to have a fleet of 100,000 cars available for lease,” according to the agreement.

Should you invest?

The majority of initial public offerings (IPOs) are volatile at first. You have a large influx of early investors who buy into the hoopla and then fade away. As a result, many IPOs experience a drop in the period following the IPO. We’ve already listed Uber and Lyft, but we can think of a few more. JFrog Ltd. (NASDAQ: FROG) has dropped 33% since its first public offering in October. Snowflake Inc. (NYSE: SNOW), the largest software IPO in history, dropped 40% after rising 61% in the months afterward. This is how most initial public offerings (IPOs) go, which is why we constantly advise against investing in them immediately. You might want to get in as quickly as possible in some circumstances. But, in most cases, it’s better to wait for the euphoria to settle down and see whether the stock can return to a stable state i.e. the actual value. You should also be wary of the company’s particular industry.

It’s difficult to be positive about a ride-hailing service, using Uber and Lyft as examples. But, as we already stated, DiDi’s case may be different. As both Uber and Lyft have been embroiled in a price war across the United States, which has caused their stock prices to plummet.

DiDi has the advantage of having China almost entirely to themselves, as well as having infiltrated overseas markets. A user base seven times that of what many consider the industry’s biggest brand (Uber) might have a significant impact on DiDi’s stock performance following its IPO. As a result, the stock is more likely to be a buy than Uber or Lyft. However, because Uber is a shareholder, DiDi’s success might put money in Uber’s pocket, giving Uber an even bigger advantage in its struggle with Lyft. If you want to purchase Didi stock, it is advisable to get it at the right price

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This article has been co-authored by Sayan Mitra and Yogesh Lakhotia, who is in the Research and Insights team of Torre Capital.

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